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EXPLAINING PARTICIPATION IN UNDECLARED WORK IN FRANCE: LESSONS FOR POLICY 
EVALUATION 
Abstract 
Purpose 
France is as a model of best-practice in the European Union as regards policy to combat 
undeclared work. This paper takes the country as a case study with which to evaluate the 
competing explanations of why people engage in undeclared work which underpin such 
policy: namely, the dominant rational-economic actor approach and the more recent social-
actor approach.  
  
Methodology 
To evaluate these approaches, the results of 1,027 interviews undertaken in 2013 with a 
representative sample of the French population are analysed.  
  
Findings 
The finding is that higher perceived penalties and risks of detection have no significant 
impact on the likelihood of conducting undeclared work in France. In contrast, the level of 
tax morale has a significant impact on engagement in the activity: the higher the tax morale, 
the lower is the likelihood of participation in the undeclared economy. Higher penalties and 
risks of detection only decrease the likelihood of participation in undeclared work amongst 
the small minority of the French population with very low tax morale. 
 
Practical Implications 
Current policy in France to counter undeclared work is informed principally by the rational 
economic actor approach based on a highly-developed infrastructure for detection and 
significant penalties alongside incentives to declare small-scale own-account work. The 
present analysis suggests that this approach needs to be supplemented with measures to 
improve citizens’ commitment to compliance by enhancing tax morale. 
 
Originality/value 
This case study of a country with a well-developed policy framework to combat undeclared 
work provides evidence to support the social-actor approach to informing policy change.   
 
Keywords: informal sector, shadow economy, tax evasion, tax morale, France 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, it has been recognised that the undeclared economy is a widespread 
phenomenon and that it is growing rather than declining in many countries and global 
regions (Williams, 2014a,b; Williams and Schneider, 2016). For example, one recent analysis 
estimates that 59% of all new businesses in OECD countries start-up unregistered and 
operate on an undeclared basis (Autio and Fu, 2015). This has significant negative 
consequences: economies lose their competitiveness due to productive registered formal 
enterprises suffering unfair competition from unproductive unregistered enterprises and 
registered enterprises operating partially off-the-books (Leal Ordóñez, 2014); governments 
lose tax revenue (Bajada and Schneider, 2005) and regulatory control over work conditions 
(ILO, 2014) and customers lack legal recourse and certainty that health and safety 
regulations have been followed (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). Undeclared workers, 
moreover, lack entitlement to labour rights such as the minimum wage and sick pay, cannot 
build up rights to the state pension and access occupational pension schemes, and lack 
access to health and safety standards as well as bargaining rights and voice (Andrews et al., 
2011; European Commission, 2007). It is therefore important to consider how best 
undeclared work might be prevented which of course entails a clear understanding of what 
predisposes people to engage in undeclared work.  
 The aim of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the different explanatory perspectives 
that inform policy measures to tackle undeclared work. The conventional approach adopted 
by governments based on the rational economic-actor model to explain participation in the 
activity views the undertaking of undeclared work as arising when the benefits from 
participation outweigh the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972). Adopting this explanatory framework, governments thus develop policies 
which increase the actual or perceived risks of detection and sanctions to deter 
participation. Nevertheless, it has been established that many citizens do not engage in 
undeclared work even when the pay-off is greater than the expected costs (Alm et al., 2010; 
Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008), a situation that the rational-economic actor approach cannot 
explain. In order to arrive at such an explanation, the “social-actor” approach has emerged 
more recently that explains participation in undeclared work as a product of low tax 
morality, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Cummings et al., 2009). A current 
policy debate is therefore whether measures rooted solely in the conventional rational-
economic actor approach need to be either replaced or combined with those arising from a 
social-actor approach that fosters improvements in tax morality so as to foster greater 
voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012).   
Given this aim, the paper will take France as a case study since it is a country often 
viewed as a model within the European Union as regards policy towards tackling undeclared 
work. Indeed, France has been a policy ‘early bird’ within the rational-economic-actor 
frame. The country has developed both a coherent administrative framework for the 
detection and sanctioning of undeclared work as well as incentives to declare small-scale 
own-account work. For example, in the law of March 1997 for the reinforcement of the fight 
against illegal work created a new cross-departmental Delegation interministérielle à la 
Lutte contre le Travail Illégal (DILTI: Interministerial committee for the fight against illegal 
work) to coordinate the work of all relevant ministries and agencies alongside trade unions 
and employer organisations at local, regional and national level to detect and sanction 
Page 2 of 18International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
undeclared work. Alongside this framework for detecting undeclared work and enforcing 
compliance, the French government has also invested in measures to lessen the relative 
benefits of undeclared work with schemes that offer tax breaks and the simplification of 
bureaucratic procedures within sectors particularly prone to undeclared work and for very 
small businesses. These include the 2006 ‘Chèque emploi service universel’ (CESU - 
Universal personal services voucher) which simplifies the procedures for hiring a worker to 
provide services to the household and is accompanied by tax breaks (Windebank, 2009) and 
the 2009 creation of the status of ‘autoentrepreneur’ (self-employed entrepreneur) 
designed to facilitate formalized secondary- or multi-activity by greatly simplifying the 
declaration procedures of very-small self-employed concerns (Barreul, 2012). 
 In the following section the article therefore explains the rational-economic actor and 
social-actor approaches towards explaining and tackling the undeclared economy and 
whether they can be combined. The third section then introduces the data and methodology 
to evaluate these approaches, namely a logistic regression analysis of 1,027 interviews 
conducted in France during 2013. In the fourth section, the findings are reported. This 
reveals no association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level of 
penalties and risk of detection amongst the French participants, but a significant positive 
association between participation in undeclared work and the level of tax morality, along 
with how deterrents only impact on the likelihood of participation when tax morale is low. In 
the fifth and final section, the implications for theory and policy are then discussed. 
 Before commencing, however, the undeclared economy must be defined. Here, and 
reflecting the consensus among academics and practitioners, we define undeclared work as 
paid activity that is legal in all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, 
social security or labour law purposes, when it should be declared (European Commission, 
2007; OECD, 2012; Williams and Windebank, 1998). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is 
not defined as undeclared work. If the goods or services traded are illegal for instance (e.g., 
illegal drugs), then it is not part of the undeclared economy, but the wider criminal 
economy.   
 
Preventing undeclared work: a review of explanatory frameworks and related policy 
approaches 
 
Reviewing the literature on how to tackle the undeclared economy, two contrasting 
approaches can be identified. The rational-economic-actor approach has its origins in the 
classic utilitarian theory of crime that depicts citizens as engaging in such acts when the 
expected costs (that is, the probability of being caught and ensuing sanctions) do not 
outweigh the benefits (Bentham, 1788). This approach was popularised by Becker (1968) 
who argued that by increasing the sanctions and probability of detection confronting those 
considering or actually disobeying the law, acting legally would become the rational choice 
of citizens. This was subsequently applied to tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
who viewed non-compliance as occurring when the benefits outweighed the expected costs 
of doing so. To change the cost/benefit ratio confronting citizens thinking about 
participating or actually engaging in tax evasion, the argument was that the actual and/or 
perceived risks of detection and sanctions must be increased. This approach was 
subsequently widely adopted when explaining and tackling the undeclared economy 
(Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001).  
Page 3 of 18 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 Previous research has produced mixed results regarding the effectiveness of 
increasing the risks of detection and penalties in reducing undeclared work. Although some 
evaluations have found that increasing the probability of detection reduces engagement in 
undeclared work, at least for some income groups (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Slemrod et al., 
2001) and that increasing penalties decreases participation in undeclared work (Wenzel, 
2004), others have concluded that increasing the risks of detection does not lessen non-
compliance (Shaw et al., 2008) and that raising the penalties results in either greater 
participation, has no effect, or only short-term effects (Feld and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2005; 
Spicer and Lunstedt, 1976).  
 The present study will therefore seek to evaluate this rational economic actor 
approach by testing the following hypothesis: 
   
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): increasing the perceived penalties and 
probability of detection lowers the likelihood of participation in undeclared work. 
H1a: increasing the perceived penalties lowers the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work. 
H1b: increasing the perceived probability of detection lowers the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work. 
 
Given that many citizens do not engage in undeclared work even when the benefits 
outweigh the costs (Alm et al., 2010; Murphy, 2008), a new approach has emerged that 
portrays citizens as social actors and explains engagement in undeclared work to result from 
low tax morality, by which is meant a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler, 
2006, 2011; McKerchar et al., 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Williams 
and Shahid, 2016). Policy based on this explanation for participation in undeclared work 
would therefore seek to increase tax morality so as to improve the commitment of citizens 
to voluntarily comply (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2011). This social-actor approach has its 
origins in the scholarship of Georg von Schanz (1890), the first scholar to highlight the 
existence of a tax contract between citizens and the state. Six decades later, the German 
“Cologne school of tax psychology” then popularised this approach and measured the level 
of tax morality (Schmölders, 1962; Strümpel, 1969). Although this social-actor approach 
declined in popularity with the emergence of the rational-economic-actor approach from 
the 1970s onwards, the last decade or so has seen its re-emergence (Alm et al., 2012; 
Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2011). Here, therefore, reductions in undeclared work are sought by 
engendering greater self-regulation. This voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour 
comes about when there is a high-commitment, high-trust culture in which  citizens’ values 
align with the formal rules imposed by the state (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012). It 
could be suggested therefore that the implementation of strong deterrents to enforce 
compliance may be counterproductive in that measures such as close supervision and 
monitoring of citizens, the imposition of tight rules and prescribed procedures and 
centralised structures engender a low-trust, low-commitment and adversarial culture.  
 The social-actor perspective can be linked to institutional theory in which institutions 
represent “the rules of the game” and prescribe what activities are acceptable within a 
given society (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North 1994; Mathias et al., 2014; 
North, 1990, Williams et al, 2015). In all societies, there are both formal institutions (that is, 
codified laws and regulations) that set out the legal rules of the game and thus prescribe 
“state morality”, as well as informal institutions which are the “socially shared rules, usually 
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unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727) and prescribe “civic morality”. From a social-
actor perspective, any asymmetry which arises when the formal institutions (“state 
morality”) and informal institutions (“civic morality”), measured by the level of tax morality, 
may result in participation in undeclared work.  In order to reduce levels of undeclared 
work, therefore, it would be argued that policy should attempt to align civic morality with 
state. To evaluate such an approach therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): improving tax morality lowers the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work. 
 
It should not be thought that policies inspired by the rational-economic actor and 
social-actor perspectives are mutually exclusive. Indeed, it can be argued that governments 
can pursue not only “enforced” compliance by increasing the sanctions and probabilities of 
detection and therefore the power of authorities, but also “voluntary” compliance by 
fostering tax morality and thus trust in government (Kirchler et al., 2008; Kogler et al., 2015; 
Kastlunger et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014; Muehlbacher et al., 2011; Prinz et al., 
2013; Wahl et al., 2010). When there is no trust in authorities and they have no power, the 
argument is that there will be greater engagement in the undeclared economy. When trust 
in, and/or the power of, authorities increases nevertheless, engagement in undeclared work 
declines. Wahl et al (2010) in a laboratory experiment randomly presented each participant 
with one of four different descriptions of a fictitious country, in which the authorities are 
portrayed as trustworthy or untrustworthy and as powerful or powerless. They found that 
participants paid significantly more taxes when both power and trust were high. The 
outcome has been an argument that combining these two policy approaches is the most 
effective way of tackling undeclared work (Kogler et al., 2015; Muehlbacher et al., 2011).   
However, it is also necessary to take into account the possibility that a potentially 
complex interaction exists between increasing the power of authorities and trust in 
authorities and that the impacts of increasing the probability of detection and sanctions 
may vary at different levels of tax morality. Increasing the risks of detection and penalties 
might result in greater non-compliance when tax morality is high, due to a breakdown of 
trust between the state and its citizens (Chang and Lai, 2004; Kirchler et al., 2014). In other 
words, tax morality might moderate the impacts of increasing the perceived probabilities of 
detection and sanctions on engagement in undeclared work. Until now, however, little if 
any research has been conducted on these moderating effects. In consequence, the 
following hypothesis will be tested in the present analysis:  
 
Moderating impacts hypothesis (H3): the impacts of sanctions and risks of detection 
on engagement in undeclared work will vary according to the level of tax morality. 
H3a: the impacts of the perceived penalties on participation on engagement in 
undeclared work will vary according to the level of tax morality. 
H3b: the impacts of the perceived risk of detection on engagement in undeclared 
work will vary according to the level of tax morality. 
 
Methodology 
Data 
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To evaluate these explanatory perspectives and related public policy approaches for tackling 
the undeclared economy, data is reported from special Eurobarometer survey no. 402 which 
included 1,027 face-to-face interviews conducted in France between April and May 2013 in 
the national language with adults aged 15 years and older. A multi-stage random 
(probability) sampling methodology ensured that on the issues of gender, age, region and 
locality size, each level of sample is representative in proportion to its population size. For 
the univariate analysis, a sample weighting scheme is used to obtain meaningful descriptive 
results, as recommended in the wider literature (Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; 
Winship and Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology. For the multivariate 
analysis however, debate exists over whether to use a weighting scheme (Pfefferman, 1993; 
Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the 
majoritarian view, the decision was taken not to do so.  
Adopting a gradual approach towards the more sensitive questions, the face-to-face 
interviews firstly asked participants attitudinal questions regarding the acceptability of 
various forms of undeclared work and their views of the expected penalties and risks of 
detection, followed by questions on whether they had purchased and supplied undeclared 
goods. Here, we focus firstly upon the questions on the supply of undeclared work and 
secondly on attitudinal questions examining the level of tax morale and the respondent 
perceived penalties and risk of detection in respect with participation in undeclared 
economy.  
 
Variables 
To evaluate the degree to which it is the penalties and risks of detection and/or the level of 
tax morality which reduce the likelihood of participation in undeclared work in France, the 
dependent variable used examines who engages in undeclared work and is a dummy 
variable with recorded value 1 for persons who answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Apart from 
a regular employment, have you yourself carried out any undeclared paid activities in the 
last 12 months?’.  
To evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work and the policy 
measures, three explanatory variables are used. Firstly, to evaluate whether the perceived 
risk of detection influences participation, a dummy variable is used describing the perceived 
risk of being detected when engaging in undeclared work, with value 0 for a very small or 
fairly small risk and value 1 for a fairly high or very high risk. Secondly, to evaluate how 
penalties are associated with participation in undeclared economy, a dummy variable is 
used, describing the expected sanctions if caught doing undeclared work, with value 0 for 
normal tax or social security contributions due and value 1 for normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus fine or prison. 
Third and finally, to evaluate the association between participation in the undeclared 
economy and the level of tax morality, participants were asked to rate the acceptability of 
participating in six types of undeclared work using a 10-point Likert scale (where 1 means 
absolutely unacceptable and 10 means absolutely acceptable), namely: an individual is hired 
by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to the tax or social 
security authorities even though it should be declared; a firm is hired by a household for 
work and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security authorities; a 
firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or social 
security authorities; a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her 
are not officially declared; someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; and 
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someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income. An 
aggregate tax morality index for each individual was then constructed by collating 
participants’ responses to the six questions. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of the scale is 
0.854 which shows a good internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000). Here, the index is 
represented in the original 10-point Likert scale format, meaning that the lower the index 
value, the higher is their tax morality.  
Drawing upon previous studies evaluating participation in undeclared work from 
either the supply- and/or demand-side (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b), the control 
variables selected are:  
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males. 
 Age: a continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent. 
 Occupation: a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation with 
value 1 for self-employed, value 2 for employed, and value 3 for not working. 
 People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, 
value 2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more. 
 Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
 Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in paying 
bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, and 
value 3 for almost never/ never. 
 Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for 
rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
 
Analytical methods  
To evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived 
penalties and risk of detection, and the level of tax morality, only those 854 respondents for 
whom data on each and every control variable was available are here used in the logistic 
regression analysis. Below, the results are reported. 
 
Findings 
 
As Table 1 displays, 5 per cent of the 854 French interviewees who were interviewed face-
to-face reported engaging in undeclared work during the 12 months prior to interview, a 
figure slightly higher than that of the Western European or EU28 average. Table 1 also 
reveals the variations between those who engage in undeclared work and those who do not 
regarding their perceptions of the expected sanctions against and risks of detection of 
participation in such work and their tax morality. Those participating in undeclared work 
perceive the expected sanctions as lower than those not engaged in undeclared work: 23% 
of those participating in undeclared work consider that only the normal tax or social security 
contributions will be due if caught compared with 18% of those not participating in 
undeclared work. Overall, a greater percentage of respondents in France, whether 
undertaking undeclared work or not, consider that sanctions will be high (including a fine or 
prison) than in Western Europe or the EU28. Meanwhile, 66% of French respondents doing 
undeclared work perceive the risk of being detected as very small or fairly small, compared 
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with 62% of those not participating in undeclared work. As compared with Western Europe 
and the EU 28, a higher percentage of those engaging in undeclared work believe the risk of 
detection to be fairly high or high in France whilst this percentage is lower in France than in 
the rest of Europe amongst those not engaging in undeclared work. Those participating in 
undeclared work in France, moreover, have a lower level of tax morale (3.9) compared with 
those not engaging in undeclared work (2.0) and in comparison with those engaging in 
undeclared work in Western Europe (3.7) and in the EU28 (3.5). Similarly those not engaging 
in undeclared work in France still have a lower tax morale (2.0) than those in Western 
Europe (2.1) and in the EU28 (2.2). In sum, French participants in undeclared work view the 
severity of the punishment as lower and the risk of detection smaller and have a lower level 
of tax morale than those not participating in undeclared work. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis which evaluates the 
hypotheses regarding whether participation in undeclared work is significantly associated 
with firstly, the level of sanctions and risk of detection and secondly, tax morality. It also 
shows that the social groups in France most likely to participate in undeclared work are 
younger people and the self-employed. Examining whether participation in undeclared work 
in France is associated with the perceived level of penalties and risk of detection, no 
significant association is found between participation in undeclared work and the perceived 
level of sanctions (refuting H1a). As such, when respondents perceive the level of sanctions 
to be higher, this does not result in lower levels of participation in undeclared work. 
Similarly, we found no significant association between the perceived risk of detection and 
participation in undeclared work, when other variables are held constant (refuting H1b). 
However, there is a significant association between participation in undeclared work and tax 
morality. The greater the level of tax morality, the lower is the propensity to participate in 
undeclared work (confirming H2). The outcome of Model 1 is therefore that little or no 
association is found between the likelihood of participating in undeclared work and the level 
of punishments or risk of detection but a strong association is identified with the level of tax 
morality. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
To examine whether tax morality moderates the impacts and effectiveness of 
penalties and detection risk, model 2 in Table 2 introduces the interaction terms between 
tax morality and the level of punishment and risk of detection. Overall, the finding is that 
the interaction terms between perceived penalties and risk of detection, and tax morality, 
are not significant (refuting H3a and H3b). However, although there is overall a lack of 
significance of the interaction terms, some important relationships exist at lower levels of 
tax morality that need to be reported. Figure 1 graphically portrays the impact of increasing 
the penalties and risks of detection on participation in undeclared work at various levels of 
tax morality for a “representative” French citizen, derived by taking the mean and modal 
values of the other independent variables. This representative French citizen is thus a 47 
year-old woman who does not work, living in a two person household in a small or middle 
sized town, with no children who never, or almost never, faces financial difficulties paying 
the household bills.  Figure 1 reveals firstly that the expected probability of engaging in 
Page 8 of 18International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
undeclared work increases with worsening the tax morality from close to zero, when tax 
morality is high (i.e., the tax morality index is 1), to between 59% and 86% depending on the 
perceived level of punishments and detection risk when tax morality is very poor (i.e., the 
tax morality index equals 10).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Indeed, when tax morality is relatively high (i.e., below a score of 3), increasing the 
perceived level of sanctions and risks of detection has relatively little effect on the 
probability of participation in undeclared work. However, as tax morality worsens above a 
tax morality index score of 3, the perceived level of punishment and risk of detection 
becomes more influential in shaping the level of participation in undeclared work. In such 
low trust environments, it is largely the perceived risk of detection rather than the level of 
penalties which reduces participation in undeclared work. The higher the perceived risk of 
detection, the lower is the probability of participation in undeclared work. However, as 
mentioned above, the interaction terms are not statistically significant.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
To evaluate the rational-economic-actor approach towards explaining and tackling 
undeclared work, the emergent social-actor approach and how the two might combine, we 
have examined how the expected risks of detection and sanctions and the level of tax 
morality is associated with participation in undeclared work in France. The finding is that 
there is no association between respondents perceiving higher risks of detection and levels 
of sanctions and lower rates of participation in undeclared work.  However, higher levels of 
tax morality are associated with lower levels of participation in undeclared work. 
Furthermore, although when the expected risks of detection and penalties are higher, the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work is lower when tax morality is low, overall the 
interaction effects between the level of penalties and risks of detection, and level of tax 
morality are not significant. In sum, therefore, these findings reveal that the model of the 
rational-economic actor perspective cannot adequately explain individuals’ participation in 
undeclared work. Indeed, despite the highly developed nature of deterrent policies in 
France and the resultant level of fear of both detection and sanctions that is higher than the 
EU average in most categories, it has been shown that a greater percentage of French 
respondents than average in the EU undertake undeclared work. Conversely, the tax morale 
of the French is slightly lower than the EU28 average and indeed the average for Western 
Europe. 
On the basis of these findings concerning how to explain individuals’ participation in 
undeclared work, it might thus be tentatively suggested that further investment by the 
French government in structures such as the DILTI may not yield the desired results. It 
would seem rather that policy which focuses on improving tax morality may prove more 
effective in the long term than policy to enhance deterrents. Viewing low tax morality 
through the lens of institutional theory as a measure of the lack of alignment of the laws, 
codes and regulations of formal institutions, namely ‘state morality’, with the norms, beliefs 
and values of informal institutions, namely ‘civic morality’, (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; 
North, 1990), the suggestion is that there is a need to reduce this institutional asymmetry. 
On the one hand, this requires changes in the norms, values and beliefs regarding the 
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acceptability of participating in undeclared work (that is, civic morality) but also, on the 
other hand, changes in formal institutions. As revealed in previous studies in other advanced 
economies, compliance improves when there are improvements in procedural justice, which 
refers to whether citizens perceive the government to treat them in a respectful, impartial 
and responsible manner (Gangl et al., 2013; Murphy, 2005), procedural fairness, which 
refers to the extent to which citizens believe that they are paying their fair share compared 
with others (Molero and Pujol, 2012) and redistributive justice, which refers to whether 
citizens believe they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes that they 
pay (Kirchgässner, 2011).  
Policy change may therefore have to be much more wide-ranging to have an impact 
on civic morality than measures targeted specifically at undeclared work. There is debate, 
however, on what the direction of this change should be: for example, Williams (2014a) has 
argued that formal economic systems which are wealthier and more equal and where there 
is greater labour market intervention, higher levels of social protection and more effective 
redistribution via social transers are significantly correlated with lower levels of 
informalisation and undeclared work. In contrast, it has been argued that the re-alignment 
of civic and state morality elies on the state drawing back from interference in citizens’ lives 
through legislation and taxation (De Soto, 2001; London and Hart, 2004)  
There are a number of aspects of the French economy, society and political life 
which may influence tax morality negatively but which would require deep transformations 
in ‘state morality’ and in the public perception of this state morality. First, although poverty 
and inequality in France have traditionally been below the OECD average (OECD, 2008) with 
high degrees of spending on benefits, the country suffers from strong labour-market 
segmentation by age and qualifications (Milner, 2015). There is a widespread perception 
that the core labour force, represented by trades unions which pressure state institutions, 
protects its advantages at the expense of the peripheral workforce of the young, low 
qualified and ethnic minorities who find themselves either unemployed or in very 
precarious work and who may therefore perceive undeclared work to be a preferable or 
indeed sole option to secure an income or to supplement a low formal income. Second, 
there is a long-standing dissatisfaction with the French state on the part of small business 
owners, retailers and the self-employed which dates back to the 1950s and beyond. In terms 
of varieties of capitalism, France has traditionally been located on “the statist end of the 
market-state spectrum” (Milner, 2015, p.229) since the period of rapid state-led 
modernization following the Second World War. During this period, small business owners 
felt that their interests were being sacrificed, a dissatisfaction which gave rise to the political 
movement of Poujadisme – a movement whose spirit lives on in right-wing politics today. 
This movement grew from an act of citizen resistance to the state in the form of a refusal to 
cooperate with tax inspections by small business owners led by Pierre Poujade in his 
department of the Lot (Souillac, 2007). Lastly, there is the question of the social 
contributions that employees and employers have to pay in France which are high relative 
to comparable countries. As Morel and Carbonnier (2015) suggest, the growth of formal 
low-end service sector jobs, such as those in household services, retail and the hotel and 
restaurant sector, have been constrained in France due to labour-market and welfare 
institutions where strongly regulated labour markets combine with a compressed wage 
structure and relatively high wages even for the low-skilled along with generous social 
protection schemes. Employers and employees alike may therefore feel it just to circumvent 
these constraining regulations in order to provide services or pay wages which are 
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affordable. The French policies which incentivise the regularisation of activities in the 
household services sector or in very small businesses have in fact been implemented to 
address exactly this problem.  
In conclusion, if this paper results in re-evaluations of these various approaches 
towards explaining and tackling undeclared work, as well as the complex interplay between 
increasing deterrents and improving tax morality, in the French and wider European 
context, one of its principal aims will have been fulfilled. If this analysis has any impact on 
policy change, it will have fulfilled a broader intention. If there is one certainty arising out of 
this paper, however, it is that the French government and others can no longer simply 
assume that rebalancing the economic costs and benefits of engaging in undeclared work is 
the most effective way of reducing the level of such activity. Although much more difficult 
to operationalise, the way forward for tacking undeclared work must lie in improving tax 
morality amongst citizens. 
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Table 1. Expected sanctions, detection risk and tax morale: by whether engaged in 
undeclared work 
 
  
 France Western 
Europe 
EU 28 
Engaged in undeclared work (%) 5 4 4 
Expected sanctions (%)    
Tax or social security contributions due 23 26 32 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison 77 74 68 
Detection risk (%)    
Very small/ Fairly small    66 70 72 
Fairly high/ Very high 34 30 28 
Tax morality (mean) 3.9 3.7 3.5 
Not engaged in undeclared work (%) 95 96 96 
Expected sanctions (%)    
Tax or social security contributions due 18 19 24 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison 82 81 76 
Detection risk (%)    
Very small/ Fairly small    62 59 59 
Fairly high/ Very high 38 41 41 
Tax morality (mean) 2.0 2.1 2.2 
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Table 2. Logistic regressions of the propensity to participate in undeclared work in France 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 β  Robust 
se(β) 
Exp(β) β  Robust 
se(β) 
Exp(β) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)      
Tax or social security contributions + 
fine or prison 
-0.121  0.483 0.886 -0.410  0.824 0.664 
Detection risk (Very small/ Fairly small)         
Fairly high/ Very high -0.448  0.409 0.639 -0.070  0.811 0.933 
Tax morality 0.646 *** 0.091 1.908 0.638 **
* 
0.177 1.893 
Gender (Female)         
Male -0.478  0.408 0.620 -0.479  0.411 0.620 
Age (Exact age) -0.035 *** 0.012 0.966 -0.033 ** 0.013 0.967 
Occupation (Self-employed)         
Employed -1.926 *** 0.642 0.146 -1.954 **
* 
0.637 0.142 
Not working -1.460 ** 0.640 0.232 -1.477 ** 0.635 0.228 
People 15+ years in own household (One)        
Two -0.514  0.463 0.598 -0.495  0.465 0.610 
Three and more -0.210  0.545 0.811 -0.198  0.540 0.821 
Children (No children)         
Having children 0.190  0.468 1.210 0.194  0.472 1.214 
Difficulties paying bills (Most of the time)        
From time to time -0.651  0.508 0.522 -0.625  0.514 0.535 
Almost never/ never -0.395  0.460 0.674 -0.368  0.468 0.692 
Area (Rural area or village)         
Small or middle sized town 0.031  0.467 1.031 0.056  0.467 1.058 
Large town 0.739  0.502 2.094 0.758  0.504 2.135 
Interactions         
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison x Tax morality  0.078  0.194 1.081 
Fairly high/ Very high x Tax morality     -0.106  0.187 0.900 
Constant -0.980  1.199 0.375 -1.006  1.337 0.366 
N 854 854 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2483 0.2497 
Log pseudolikelihood -114.5093 -114.2896 
χ
2
 94.92 96.46 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
When multiple imputation techniques are used (ten imputations were simulated through a system of chained 
equations for every missing value) for addressing the missing responses issue, the same variables are 
significantly associated with participation in the informal economy. Therefore, we use the available data, with 
no imputation, to keep minimize bias. 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of participating in undeclared work of a “representative” 
citizen living in France: by expected sanctions, detection risk, and tax morality 
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Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 854) 
Variables Definition Mode or mean 
Min / 
Max 
Supply of 
undeclared work 
(dependent 
variable) 
Dummy variable of undeclared paid 
activities carry out in the last 12 months, 
apart from a regular employment 
Not engaged in 
undeclared work 
(95%) 
0 / 1 
Expected sanctions Dummy for the penalties associated with 
participation in undeclared activities 
Tax or social security 
contributions + fine 
or prison (81%) 
0 / 1 
Detection risk Dummy for the perceived risk of 
detection 
Very small/ Fairly 
small (62%) 
0 / 1 
Tax morality Constructed index of self-reported 
tolerance towards tax non-compliance 
2.1 1 / 8.5 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (51%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent exact age 47 years 15 / 
91 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Employed (47%) 1 / 3 
People 15+ years in 
own household 
People 15+ years in espondent`s 
household (including the respondent) in 
categories 
Two (50%) 1 / 3 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up 
to 14 years old) in the household 
No children (66%) 0 / 1 
Difficulties paying 
bills 
Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(59%) 
1 / 3 
Area Size of the area where the respondent 
lives in categories 
Small/ middle town 
(42%) 
1 / 3 
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